



CJ2 Division
European Union Naval Force
European Union Operation HQ
Northwood Headquarters
Sandy Lane
Northwood
Middlesex HA6 3HP

27 JUNE 2011

SOMALI PIRACY – JULY 2011 TO DECEMBER 2011: ASSESSED ACTIVITY

1. The aim of this document is to provide a baseline assessment for industry regarding the activity of Somali pirates between July 2011 and December (inclusive) 2011.

EXPECTED TRENDS JULY TO DECEMBER 2011

Basic Attack Tactics

2. The basic attack tactic of skiffs with large outboard motors, carrying 4-6 armed SPs, utilising a ladder (or other crude climbing gear) to board an MV is unlikely to change. The number of skiffs in a Pirate Action Group (PAG) may change in response to factors employed by industry (such as armed security) and the method of getting those skiffs to the vicinity of shipping is evolving (use of dhows as pirate 'mother-ships'), but the basic attack tactic is unlikely to change in a significant manner in the next six months; pirates will continue to rely on small high speed skiffs to *actually* board their target vessels. Vessels under attack will continue to witness the firing of small arms (assault rifles such as AK 47s) and limited use of Rocket Propelled Grenades (RPGs). The pirate intention in the use of these weapons is always to stop and slow the vessel rather than kill the crew or cause catastrophic damage. We do not expect major changes in this approach in the next six months.



Fig: 1 A Typical Pirate Attack Skiff with RPG and Boarding Ladder.

Geographical Spread and Operational Tempo

3. The threat from Somali Piracy has increased year on year and this trend is likely to continue. The Somali Pirates (SPs) are likely to put more Pirates to sea, and although a significant number are likely to be disrupted by Counter-Piracy forces, many will still successfully deploy. As shipping lanes move ever further from the Somali Coast, so the pirates will follow, searching for targets potentially not employing BMP or protection measures because they assume they are not in Pirate operating areas. The push towards the East may be tempered by Indian counter-piracy operations and successes. Increasingly the shipping lanes into Mombassa and Dar es Salaam, and the Southern Somali Basin in general will likely see an increase in activity and potential spread further South. The SPs are operationally capable of operating in the Red Sea, the Northern Arabian Sea and the Gulf of Oman (GOO); isolated incidents in these areas cannot be ruled out.

Pirate 'Mother-ships' (Dhows and captured MVs/FVs)

4. The use of captured dhows, fishing vessels and pirated merchant vessels is a trend that is likely to continue. Our observations suggest that the majority of PAGs now utilise dhows as mother-ships. This is due partly to the success of CP Forces disrupting Pirate Action Groups (PAGs) off the coast and also because of the requirement for longer reach and endurance to the main shipping lanes. The most common types of dhows employed by pirates are the Yemeni and Jelbut types; both are common in the Gulf of Aden and Western Indian Ocean. The use of captured MVs as mother-ships has declined recently, with pirates probably more cautious of risking their ransom assets. We assess that captured MVs may be used as mother-ships in isolated incidents however. This will depend largely on the pirates' confidence in their ability to deploy unnoticed, the availability of a large guard force, and a sufficient fuel supply.



Fig: 2 A Typical Jelbut Type Dhow with Attack Skiff.

Pirate reactions to increased use of armed security teams and Citadels

5. Pirates will try and adapt to the increasing use of these counter-measures. To date all vessels attacked with an embarked armed security team have repelled the pirates. The standard observed response from pirates that receive fire (warning shots or return fire) from a ship is to return break off the attack and look for easier targets. The use of citadels or strong rooms has been relatively successful. SPs have tried different methods to try

UNCLASSIFIED REL INDUSTRY

and overcome this tactic, with some limited success. Attempts to breach citadels have succeeded in a small number of cases, and SPs are likely to experiment with new breaching techniques over the course of the next six months.

MONTHLY ASSESSMENTS JULY TO DECEMBER 2011

6. The baseline assessments for the months July 2011 to December 2011 (inclusive) are as follows:

July – During both 2009 and 2010, July was the quietest month in terms of overall pirate activity. The same is expected for July 2011 although that expectation is relative to the continued upward trend in pirate attacks; July 2011 is likely to be busier than the previous year although it will be much quieter than the previous two months due to the prevailing monsoonal conditions. The highest risk area will be the Gulf of Aden although recent activity suggests that a small number of pirates (perhaps limited to just one group) have looked to the Southern Red Sea for targets. **Despite this assessment, Company Security Officers and Ship's Masters should be mindful of that fact that pirates have already tried to operate in the Northern Indian Ocean during the monsoon; pirate activity in the main shipping lanes (off Oman and Yemen in particular) can no longer be completely ruled out, even in rough sea conditions. This should also be borne in mind for the month of August.**

August – Monsoonal conditions will continue to preclude pirate operations although there remains a residual threat from potential pirate ships held in the anchorages. August coincides with increases in Human Trafficking activity in the Gulf of Aden. Somali criminals involved in this activity often conduct pirate attacks against targets of opportunity during their return journeys from Yemen. It is assessed that this will be seen again in August 2011; attacks by single skiff based pirate groups, operating on the periphery of the IRTC, can be expected throughout the month. Piracy activity in the SRS remains a realistic possibility. We cannot rule out the early deployment of dhow-based pirates into the Indian Ocean from late August onwards.

September – Pirate activity will start to increase in September as the monsoon abates. There was a large rise in activity in September in 2009 and 2010, possibly as the pirates realised there were areas conducive to small boat operations. The Arabian Sea is likely to see an increase in activity before the rest of the Somali basin and Indian Ocean. The GoA is likely to remain active.

October – Pirate activity will reach a high tempo by October, with all areas (Indian Ocean, Somali Basin, Arabian Sea), including the Gulf of Aden, almost certainly being utilised by the pirates. The focus will be on the Arabian Sea and Indian Ocean, although a persistent residual level of activity in the GoA is likely. Dhow-based pirates will focus on the Arabian Sea but will likely be present across the high risk area. Whaler-based pirates (operating in smaller, open-topped 'mother-skiffs') will continue to be a threat, especially in the shipping lanes approaching Kenya and Tanzania.



Fig: 3 A ‘Whaler-based’ Pirate Action Group

November – November 2010 was the busiest month on record for Somali piracy to date, November 2011 will likely be an extremely busy month as well. November 2010 saw more than double the amount of piracy incidents than in 2009; it is unlikely the pirates will be able to more than double their operational tempo again this year although a significant increase in activity is probable. The Gulf of Aden will likely remain at risk. Piracy operations at the peripheries of the pirates’ previous geographic limits are likely during November. Dhow-based pirates will continue to focus on the Arabian Sea but will likely be present across the high risk area. Whaler-based pirates (operating in smaller, open-topped ‘mother-skiffs’) will continue to be a threat, especially in the shipping lanes approaching Kenya and Tanzania.

December – December will start to see the first effects of the Northeast (NE) Monsoon. The NE Monsoon is a lot less severe than the SW monsoon and is no longer considered a major barrier to pirate activity in the Indian Ocean as it once was. Therefore piracy activity will continue throughout December albeit at a tempo slightly reduced from the previous two months. The monsoon may cause a shift in piracy activity away from the Somali Basin to the Arabian Sea and probably the Gulf of Aden, although it’s possible there will be isolated incidents in the Somali Basin.

SUMMARY OF ASSESSED PROBABILITY OF PIRATE ACTIVITY BY AREA AND MONTH

2011	Gulf of Aden	Arabian Sea	North Somali Basin	South Somali Basin
July	Highly Likely	Realistic Possibility	Realistic Possibility	Realistic Possibility
August	Highly Likely	Realistic Possibility	Realistic Possibility	Realistic Possibility
September	Likely	Highly Likely	Highly Likely	Highly Likely
October	Likely	Almost Certain	Almost Certain	Almost Certain
November	Likely	Almost Certain	Almost Certain	Almost Certain
December	Highly Likely	Highly Likely	Likely	Likely

Above assessments are based on “*The Uncertainty Yardstick*” analytical tool. (See Guidance Matrix below).

UNCLASSIFIED REL INDUSTRY

Qualitative Statement	Associated Probability Range
Remote/Highly Unlikely	<10%
Improbable/Unlikely	15-20%
Realistic Possibility	25-50%
Probable/Likely	55-70%
Highly Likely	75-85%
Almost Certain	>90%