OPERATION ATALANTA

Colonel Richard Spencer OBE
Chief of Staff EUNAVFOR
EU NAVFOR is to **protect** WFP shipping, **other vulnerable shipping**, deter and **arrest pirates / armed robbers** in the Area of Operations, until Dec 2012

1. Protect WFP shipping
2. Safeguard other vulnerable shipping
3. Deter and arrest pirates / armed robbers
4. Monitor Fishing
• Deter
• Disrupt
• Protect
### MINIMUM FORCE REQUIREMENTS

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<th>South-West Monsoon Impact</th>
<th>Transition Phase</th>
<th>North-East Monsoon Impact</th>
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This has been agreed to and coordinated between EU / NATO / CMF
WFP Main Routes: Current Situation

• Al-Shabaab threat:
  - Pay for security
  - No women working
  - WFP is bad for Somali agriculture and work.

• Activity in the southern region suspended, except Mogadishu.

• Alternative access to central region (by road) from the north instead of Mogadishu.

• Increase in the shipments south to north ➔ longer escorts.

• Investigating use of beach ports in Hobyo / Haradheere to access the central region
### WFP Statistics since IOC

#### Shipment Statistics

- **Ships escorted:** 89 (81 EU, 8 NATO)  Average 4 per month
- **Food delivered in Somalia:** 437,000 TM  Average 21,500 per month
- **Food carried through AOO:** 605,000 TM  Average 25,000 per month

**Average people fed daily from IOC:** 1,850,000
• Flag State Agreements for WfP VPDs are important:
• c.25% of EUNAVFOR dedicated to WfP
• Without VPD – Escort fixed to max 1000yds (attack on MV PETRA 1 on Friday!)
• With VPD – free to operate out to 60 mins (100nm by helo or 20nm by ship)
• This allows our warships to do more (surveillance, deterrence, disruption)
• Industry must put pressure on Flag States.
DISRUPTIONS
20 SEP - 03 NOV 10

PREDOMINANTLY AGAINST SOMALI COAST DUE TO REVISED SOMALI BASIN CONCEPT OF OPERATIONS
ATTACKS
20 SEP - 03 NOV 10

PREDOMINANTLY IN SOUTHERN SOMALI BASIN DUE TO BALOON EFFECT (AND THAT IS WHERE THE MONSOON CLEARED FIRST)

AND EAST OF 65e BECAUSE THAT IS WHERE THE MVs ARE AND WARSHIPS ARE NOT (OUTSIDE AREA OF OPERATIONS). PIRATES ARE USING MOTHERSHIPS TO REACH THESE AREAS.
PIRATINGS
20 SEP - 03 NOV 10

ALMOST EXCLUSIVELY IN SOUTHERN SOMALI BASIN OFF TANZANIAN AND KENYAN COAST

CAPACITY BUILDING!!!
Emerging Trends

• Motherships
  – Somali Basin Concept of Operations
  – Rapid turn around of captured MVs
  – They know our impediments
  – Don’t be boarded (BMP) → If boarded, don’t be captured?

• Citadels
  – MSCHOA Advice
  – Military Pre-Conditions for Release Operations
    • 100% of crew in Citadel
    • Citadel Bullet Proof (pirates evolving to cutting equipment?)
    • Guaranteed Comms with outside world (not VHF!)
    • Propulsion denied to the Pirates
    • Water for 96+ hours
  – Still not guaranteed – MV MAGELLAN STAR
  – Other means of suppressing pirates – HALON Purge?
Somali Piracy Attacks / Hijackings

Somali Basin

2008

2009

2010

PIRATED ATTACKS

JAN FEB MAR APR MAY JUN JUL AUG SEP OCT NOV DEC

PIRATED
ATTACKS
ARE WE HAVING AN EFFECT?

Hijacks and Attacks
Hijacks Only
Attacks Only
Rising Trend
Stable Trend
Pirate Success Ratio

Number of Incidents
Success Ratio

Dec-07 Jan-08 Feb-08 Mar-08 Apr-08 May-08 Jun-08 Jul-08 Aug-08 Sep-08 Oct-08 Nov-08 Dec-08 Jan-09 Feb-09 Mar-09 Apr-09 May-09 Jun-09 Jul-09 Aug-09 Sep-09 Oct-09 Nov-09 Dec-09 Jan-10 Feb-10 Mar-10 Apr-10 May-10 Jun-10 Jul-10

0% 10% 20% 30% 40% 50% 60% 70% 80% 90% 100%

0 5 10 15 20 25
Ransom Payments

![Graph showing ransom payments over time with years 2007 to 2010]
• As Ransoms increase ($3.3M Average) …
• Time to negotiate will increase (5+ months) …
• As will the level of frustration amongst the pirates …
• Which risks the increase in the level of violence …
• Which increases the probability of a mariner being killed …
• Which, in the mind of the pirate, is a one way street!
As yet, takes no account of proportion of global shipping by Flag State.
• The solution lies ashore
• Long Term Strategy, Suitably Resourced (Decades!)
• The problem is endemic and is now becoming pandemic.
• Principle of ‘No Acceptable Level of Piracy’ is unfeasible.
• Crime on the High Seas is fundamentally problematic.
• Prosecution is not always feasible.
• The use of force is constrained by national and international law not by military appetite.
• Rules of Engagement are perfectly appropriate.
• More military force is not feasible in the long term
CHALLENGE:
SIZE OF THE OPERATION AREA
The reality is that we normally get less than 10 minutes notice of an attack!
Counter-Piracy Capacity

Time

Capability

Risk?

More Risk?
Cooperative Development

- Military 'Hold the Line'
- Increased Industry Self Protection Measures
- Djibouti Code of Conduct & wider Capacity Building
- Comprehensive Somalia Strategy within the wider Horn of Africa
Other Thoughts?

• Industry SHADE?
• Industry MERCURY?
• Enforceable/Mandatory CP Practices
  – Warranting? Can Insurance Industry Do More?
  – ISPS Code?
• Increased Awareness
  – Organisation → CSO → SSO?
  – STCW 95 – Outreach to Nautical Colleges.
  – Increased Outreach to Industry.
• Place of Private Armed Security?
  – Co-Exist → Cooperate → Coordinate → Collaborate?
  – Beyond the Pale for EU collectively but nations or industry could do more to certify.
• Asian Shipping Industry?
• Convoy Coordination through IRTC is a joke, and is getting worse. Now routinely running 3-4 convoys in one direction within 12 hours and nothing going the other direction for 3 days! Industry must push Independent Deployers harder. You are the ‘customer’!!!
• The Military Resource is finite and only treats the symptoms – Holding the Line!
• We are currently failing to DETER.
• Disruption is confounded by national and international law.
• Ship Protection is the single most effective counter to piracy attacks – more can be done.
• Regional Maritime Capacity Building is vital
• Must be within the Context of a Comprehensive Somalia Strategy