



OPERATION ATALANTA

Colonel Richard Spencer OBE
Chief of Staff EUNAVFOR

EU NAVFOR is to protect WFP shipping, other vulnerable shipping, deter and arrest pirates / armed robbers in the Area of Operations, until Dec 2012




1. ***Protect WFP shipping***
2. ***Safeguard other vulnerable shipping***
3. ***Deter and arrest pirates / armed robbers***
4. ***Monitor Fishing***

- Deter
- Disrupt
- Protect






MINIMUM FORCE REQUIREMENTS



	FF	MPA	FF	MPA	FF	MPA	FF	MPA
GOA	9	4	9	4	9	4	9	4
SB		1	8	6	1	1	8	6
Total	9	4	17	10	10	4	17	10

This has been agreed to and coordinated between
 EU / NATO / CMF


WFP Main Routes: Current Situation



- Al-Shabaab threat:
 - Pay for security
 - No women working
 - WFP is bad for Somali agriculture and work.
- Activity in the southern region suspended, except Mogadishu.
- Alternative access to central region (by road) from the north instead of Mogadishu.
- Increase in the shipments south to north → longer escorts.
- Investigating use of beach ports in Hobyo / Harardheere to access the central region



WFP Statistics since IOC



Ships escorted: 89 (81 EU, 8 NATO) Average 4 per month

Food delivered in Somalia: 437 000 TM Average 21,500 per month

Food carried through AOO: 605 000 TM Average 25,000 per month

Average people fed daily from IOC: 1,850,000



Flag State Agreements

- Flag State Agreements for WfP VPDs are important:
- c.25% of EUNAVFOR dedicated to WfP
- Without VPD – Escort fixed to max 1000yds (attack on MV PETRA 1 on Friday!)
- With VPD – free to operate out to 60 mins (100nm by helo or 20nm by ship)
- This allows our warships to do more (surveillance, deterrence, disruption)
- Industry must put pressure on Flag States.




Disruptions Autumn 09 & Spring 10

EU NAVFOR - DISRUPTIONS LATE SEPT TO EARLY NOV 2009




EU NAVFOR - DISRUPTIONS 01 MAR TO 30 MAY 2010






DISRUPTIONS 20 SEP - 03 NOV 10


PREDOMINANTLY AGAINST
SOMALI COAST DUE TO
REVISED SOMALI BASIN
CONCEPT OF OPERATIONS



ATTACKS AUTUMN 09



ATTACKS SPRING 10







ATTACKS 20 SEP - 03 NOV 10

PREDOMINANTLY IN SOUTHERN SOMALI BASIN DUE TO BALOON EFFECT (AND THAT IS WHERE THE MONSOON CLEARED FIRST)


AND EAST OF 65e BECAUSE THAT IS WHERE THE MVs ARE AND WARSHIPS ARE NOT (OUTSIDE AREA OF OPERATIONS). PIRATES ARE USING MOTHERSHIPS TO REACH THESE AREAS.



EU NAVFOR - PIRATED VESSELS LATE SEPT TO EARLY NOV 2009



EU NAVFOR - PIRATED VESSELS 01 MAR TO 30 MAY 2010






PIRATINGS
20 SEP - 03 NOV 10




**ALMOST EXCLUSIVELY IN
SOUTHERN SOMALI BASIN
OFF TANZANIAN AND
KENYAN COAST**

CAPACITY BUILDING!!!








- Motherships
 - Somali Basin Concept of Operations
 - Rapid turn around of captured MVs
 - They know our impediments
 - Don't be boarded (BMP) → If boarded, don't be captured?
- Citadels
 - MSCHOA Advice
 - Military Pre-Conditions for Release Operations
 - 100% of crew in Citadel
 - Citadel Bullet Proof (pirates evolving to cutting equipment?)
 - Guaranteed Comms with outside world (not VHF!)
 - Propulsion denied to the Pirates
 - Water for 96+ hours
 - Still not guaranteed – MV MAGELLAN STAR
 - Other means of suppressing pirates – HALON Purge?






Somali Piracy Attacks / Hijackings Gulf of Aden/Arabian Sea






Somali Piracy Attacks / Hijackings Somali Basin




ARE WE HAVING AN EFFECT?






Ransom Payments






- As Ransoms increase (\$3.3M Average) ...
- Time to negotiate will increase (5+ months) ...
- As will the level of frustration amongst the pirates ...
- Which risks the increase in the level of violence ...
- Which increases the probability of a mariner being killed ...
- Which, in the mind of the pirate, is a one way street!

Pirated vessels / FLAG STATE




Pirated vessels / FLAG STATE



As yet, takes no account of proportion of global shipping by Flag State.



Pirated Vessels By Owner's Nationality






- The solution lies ashore
- Long Term Strategy, Suitably Resourced (Decades!)
- The problem is endemic and is now becoming pandemic.
- Principle of '*No Acceptable Level of Piracy*' is unfeasible.

- Crime on the High Seas is fundamentally problematic.
- Prosecution is not always feasible.
- The use of force is constrained by national and international law not by military appetite.
- Rules of Engagement are perfectly appropriate.
- More military force is not feasible in the long term




CHALLENGE: SIZE OF THE OPERATION AREA






TYRANNY OF DISTANCE



The reality is that we normally get less than 10 minutes notice of an attack!




Counter-Piracy Capacity





Cooperative Development





Other Thoughts?

- Industry SHADE?
- Industry MERCURY?
- Enforceable/Mandatory CP Practices
 - Warranting? Can Insurance Industry Do More?
 - ISPS Code?
- Increased Awareness
 - Organisation → CSO → SSO?
 - STCW 95 – Outreach to Nautical Colleges.
 - Increased Outreach to Industry.
- Place of Private Armed Security?
 - Co-Exist → Cooperate → Coordinate → Collaborate?
 - Beyond the Pale for EU collectively but nations or industry could do more to certify.
- Asian Shipping Industry?
- Convoy Coordination through IRTC is a joke, and is getting worse. Now routinely running 3-4 convoys in one direction within 12 hours and nothing going the other direction for 3 days! Industry must push Independent Deployers harder. You are the 'customer'!!!



- The Military Resource is finite and only treats the symptoms – Holding the Line!
- We are currently failing to DETER.
- Disruption is confounded by national and international law.
- Ship Protection is the single most effective counter to piracy attacks – more can be done.
- Regional Maritime Capacity Building is vital
- Must be within the Context of a Comprehensive Somalia Strategy